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The 2014 European election in Malta did not put the party system under stress, and in many
ways resembled past elections. The two parties that have dominated Maltese politics since
independence shared the seats equally between them. Once again, the ‘third’, green party failed
to obtain parliamentary representation, as did the far-right party despite doubling its votes. The
good fit with the second-order electionmodelmarkedMalta as Southern Europe’smisfit.While
the comparatively weak impact of the economic crisis was a contributory factor, a combination
of institutional, cultural-historical and contextual factors provide amore accurate explanation.
Political institutions are particularly relevant because they reinforce the perfect two-party
system – the key to Malta’s political stability – and shield it from the challenge of outsiders.
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The third European Parliament election since Malta joined the European Union (EU)
took place on 24 May 2014. The two main political parties – the governing Labour
Party (Partit Laburista; PL) and the opposition Nationalist Party (Partit Nazzjonalista;
PN) – together took 93.4 per cent of the valid votes cast. Less than five per cent of the
electorate decided to switch its vote from the big parties to the smaller, ‘fringe’ parties
– not enough to cause a sensation. This confirmed that the party system remains stable
and extremely resistant to change, given that Labour and the Nationalists have
dominated it for the past 48 years.
Compared with other southern EU member states, the outcome of the 2014
European election makes Malta look like a deviant case. There was no shake-up of the
party system and nor did any Eurosceptic party seriously threaten political stability in
the country. The six seats contested were equally divided between the two main
parties. The quota for electing one member of the European Parliament (MEP) was
just under 36,000 votes, a threshold too high for any of the small parties to overcome –
failing a seismic electoral shift.
q 2015 Taylor & Francis
South European Society and Politics, 2015
Vol. 20, No. 3, 425–444, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2015.1075313
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [4
6.1
1.1
21
.16
3]
 at
 02
:05
 16
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
Once again, the third party, the green AD (Alternattiva Demokratika; Democratic
Alternative) failed to secure parliamentary representation. The Eurosceptic and far-
right party Imperium Europa (IE) almost doubled its vote tally over the 2009
European election, but this was not enough to allow it to capture a seat in the
Parliament. The EU was a relatively uncontroversial issue in the campaign. In sum, the
election showed signs that it conformed to the second-order election (SOE) model
(Reif & Schmitt 1980), where voters perceive little is at stake and vote on the basis of
domestic rather than EU-related concerns.
Why did the European election largely conform to the SOE model? Was Malta really
left untouched by the Eurosceptic wave that shook Southern Europe? How can the
outcome of the election in Malta be explained? An intuitive response might be that the
country had been only marginally affected by the economic and financial crisis that hit
the rest of Europe. Yet this would only be a partial explanation for, as we will show,
the Eurosceptic tide did not leave Malta entirely untouched. Malta’s relatively quiet
European election, we argue, is more accurately explained by a combination of
domestic institutional, cultural-historical and contextual factors.
Political institutions, notably the two-party system and the strongly majoritarian
institutional design, give the system a remarkable stability and shield it from being
challenged by outsiders. In a context in which elections are won by very narrow
margins, a highly polarised political culture supports and effectively reinforces
partisanship. This happens despite Malta’s proportional electoral system based on the
single transferable vote (STV).
Against this background, the country’s recent history has also contributed to the
marginalisation of anti-EU forces. Membership was long a contested issue in Malta.
Between 1990 and 2004 it was one of the main cleavages between the pro-European
Nationalists and anti-European Labour. When the 2003 membership referendum and
the national elections that followed resulted in a victory for ‘yes’ and for the PN that
supported it, Labour overhauled its EU policy. Given that AD is strongly pro-
European, one may infer that Euroscepticism is practically absent from Malta’s party
system – although not completely, as we shall show below.
The more recent context also provided little incentives for political actors to
campaign against the EU. Ten years after accession, the benefits of membership are still
clearly felt from a period of sustained economic growth. Overall, the costs of adapting
to Europe were outweighed by the benefits, and this was made very apparent to the
public by the effective use of cohesion funds. Moreover, the economic transformation
was paralleled by a societal change that shifted significant sectors of the population
towards more post-materialist attitudes, as epitomised by the introduction of divorce
after the 2011 referendum and a law on same-sex marriage in 2014.
The article proceeds as follows. Below we outline the SOE model and its related
expectations. We then move to the three central factors of our explanation for the
election result, which are discussed in separate sections: institutional, cultural-
historical and contingent factors. When discussing short-term contingent factors, we
also illustrate the background to the European election and the election campaign.
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We then analyse the election results in the light of the SOEmodel to see whether and to
what extent they conformed to the related expectations. The conclusions reappraise
the findings and discuss their significance.
The Second-Order Election Model
Advanced for the analysis of the first round of European elections in 1979, the SOE
model is based on the assumption that voters believe little is at stake in European
elections (Reif & Schmitt 1980, p. 9). This informs voting behaviour and makes
European election results systematically different from national, first-order elections
(FOEs). The SOE model presents two sets of aggregate hypotheses.1 The first set
concerns electoral participation: since the low stakes provide a weak incentive for
voters to go to the polls, turnout at SOEs will be lower than in FOEs; for the same
reasons, a higher percentage of invalid votes will be recorded.
A second set of hypotheses concern party choice and electoral outcomes. First,
voters use SOEs as a referendum to sanction or reward parties in government. This
generally results in governing parties losing votes to opposition parties – with an
important qualification. Whether and to what extent governmental parties actually
lose votes depends on when the SOE takes place within the electoral cycle: that is, how
close an SOE is from the previous and next FOEs. When an SOE takes place shortly
after a national election, government parties will be protected by the ‘honeymoon
effect’. The remaining party choice hypotheses of the SOE model posit that, since
voters understand they are not electing a government, they are less likely to vote
strategically and more inclined to vote for the party closest to their policy preferences.
In terms of electoral outcome the prediction is that, in comparison with FOEs, big
parties lose and small parties gain votes.
When applied to Malta’s 2014 European election, the electoral participation
hypotheses would thus predict a lower turnout and higher percentage of invalid votes.
The expectations related to party choice hypotheses are less straightforward.
In principle, the honeymoon effect is expected to last 12 months.2 However, the
European election fell only 15 months after a national election won by Labour after
nearly 25 years in opposition. Hence, we could expect the honeymoon with voters was
not entirely over, which implies that the prediction that the governing party ought to
lose votes should be tempered. Finally, the SOEmodel predicts big parties will lose and
small parties will win. While we expect this prediction to apply, we also argue that
Malta’s political institutions significantly limit the magnitude of the effect. Therefore,
we expect significant but not massive losses for the big parties, and significant but not
massive gains for the small parties.
The SOE model has been tested in successive European elections (Carrubba &
Timpone 2005; Schmitt 2005; Koepke & Ringe 2006; Hix & Marsh 2007; 2011; Marsh
1998; Hobolt & Wittrock 2011). The model encountered strikingly strong and
consistent empirical support. However, some studies noted some mechanisms that
under different circumstances may lead to different voting results. Thus, Hobolt and
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Wittrock (2011) found that more information about party stances on European
integration may weaken the SOE effect, while Hix and Marsh (2011, p. 13) noted ‘the
emergence of one aspect of a pan-European public opinion’. Together, these findings
indicate that were the context to change, voting behaviour in European elections
might also be affected.
In this respect, the 2014 European elections provided a stern test for the SOEmodel,
particularly in Southern Europe. Five years of economic crisis and austerity policies
made the EU both more salient and less popular among electorates. EU institutions
have largely been blamed for late and ineffective decisions. Those who blamed the EU
– or, in some variants, the euro – as the main cause of the crisis and the failure of the
recovery gained centrality in media and political debates. In sum, in many countries –
particularly in the south – the context of the 2014 European election was more in line
with a ‘Europe matters’ than with a ‘less at stake’ view. As we show below, Malta’s
European election largely conformed to the SOE model, and that is only partially
explained by the softer impact of the economic and financial crisis on the island.
A thorough explanation, we argue, needs to take into account Malta’s political
institutions and the long- and short-term context of the election.
The Political Institutions of Malta: Bipolarisation, Stability and Majoritarian
Democracy
Malta is a textbook case of a majoritarian democracy (Lijphart 1999). It is a perfect
two-party system, in which only the two main parties, the Nationalists and Labour,
gain access to parliament. Between 1966 and 2013, the effective number of parties
(ENP) (Laakso & Taagepera 1979) ranged between 1.97 and 2 (with an average of 1.99)
in terms of parliamentary seats, and between 2 and 2.39 (with an average of 2.07) in
terms of votes. Third parties have found it impossible to upset the Labour–Nationalist
duopoly, notwithstanding the STV proportional representation (PR) system (Katz
1984). Malta’s two-party system seems to confound Duverger’s Law (Pace 2005,
p. 124), which posits that PR systems should be conducive to multi-party systems
(Duverger 1951). The small number of parties, however, is explained by the small size
of the country (Sikk & Taagepera 2014) with its population of 425,385 (Eurostat
2015), its (extremely low) social heterogeneity (Taagepera 1999) and the historical
context of the transition to independence (Cini 2002).
The major institutional factor affecting Malta’s party system is the electoral system.
Parties are listed on the ballot in alphabetical order and candidates are also listed in
alphabetical order under each party heading. Voters mark their preferences in a slot
next to the candidate’s name and party symbol. They can also vote across party lines.
A Droop quota is used to establish the number of votes candidates must poll to secure
a seat.3 Candidates with the lowest number of votes being eliminated from the contest,
their votes are redistributed among the remaining candidates according to voters’
preferences. When a candidate reaches the quota, he or she is declared to have been
elected, the process continuing until every seat is filled. At times, as happened in the
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2014 European election, the last seat may be filled without a quota: when the last two
remaining candidates do not have sufficient votes to achieve it, the seat goes to the
candidate with the greatest number of votes.
In national elections, Malta and the smaller island of Gozo are divided into 13
electoral districts, each returning five members of parliament (MPs). Although the
electoral law ensures proportionality between the preference votes obtained nationally
by the parties and the parliamentary seats allocated to them, this mechanism operates
only if a party manages to elect at least one MP and no more than two parties enter
parliament. For the allocation of seats, candidates, votes and voters are kept separate in
each district, which turns the general election into 13 separate ballots occurring
simultaneously. Therefore, for a party to elect a seat, it needs to obtain 16–17 per cent
of the vote in an electoral district. This threshold is very high and difficult for new and
small political parties to achieve.4 In the European elections the Maltese islands
become a single electoral district, thus the threshold is even higher. The quota has
ranged from 40,954 in 2004 to 35,979 in 2014, a nationwide threshold of, respectively,
17 and 14 per cent, which is very difficult for small parties to attain. Only AD in 2004,
with a first-count tally of 22,938, managed to cross half the distance to the quota. This
mechanical effect of the electoral system is obviously strengthened by a psychological
effect, which reinforces the strategic vote for bigger parties (Duverger 1951).
The second factor that accounts for the party system’s stability is historically rooted.
From the end of the Second World War to 1966, although Labour and the Nationalists
had already emerged as the leading parties, there were a number of smaller parties in
parliament, most of them splinter groups from the two main parties. This led to a
series of unstable coalition governments between 1950 and 1955. In 1955, Labour won
an overall majority, then in 1962 the same feat was repeated by the Nationalists after
securing a single-seat parliamentary majority when a member of the smaller
Democratic Nationalist Party defected and joined it. From then onwards the electorate
consolidated around the two main parties: in less than a decade, all trace of the smaller
parties had disappeared as their supporters, activists and voters shifted their allegiance
to the two larger parties. This electoral alignment was reinforced by socio-cultural
factors (Cini 2002), given Malta’s largely homogeneous society in terms of (Maltese)
language and (Catholic) religion. Furthermore, the two large parties have consolidated
their party organisations throughout the national territory with their own clubs in
every locality, radio and television networks, newspapers and social media. This makes
it difficult for any small political formation lacking similar resources to match them in
electoral campaigning.
The electoral system and the historic developments leading to the disappearance of
the small parties, together with the consolidation of the power bases of the two large
parties, have cast the political system into a Labour–Nationalist duopoly that has
proved difficult to change. The political system cloned from the Westminster model
concentrates power in the hands of the prime minister, and strengthens the adversarial
nature of Maltese politics. The upside of this system is that it provides stable
governments that normally last the full term. The downside is that it strengthens
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political division in such a small society as Malta’s. The country’s majoritarian model
under STV means election winners gain full control of the country’s political
institutions and civil service. Since elections are often won by narrow margins,5 voters
have a powerful incentive to go to the polls. This explains Malta’s (declining yet still)
near-universal turnout (Hirczy 1995), which at national elections is generally around
95 per cent, despite the fact that voting is not compulsory.
In sum, political institutions provide the system with a remarkable stability (Pace &
Carammia forthcoming). The electoral system in particular supports an exceptionally
high threshold that prevents the entry of outsider parties that could challenge the
Labour–Nationalist hegemony.
The Long-Term Background: Malta–EU Relations Before the 2004 Enlargement
The history of Malta’s relations with the EU and application for membership is one of
ups and downs, mostly coinciding with the terms in government of the Nationalists
and Labour (Cini 2000; 2003; 2004; Pace 2002; 2004; 2005), but also crossing the
deeper, multiple European/Mediterranean identities of the Maltese. After being elected
to govern the country before and immediately after independence in 1964, the
Nationalist Party pursued close relations with the EU. Labour won the national
elections in 1971, opening a long cycle of Labour government lasting until 1987. The
policy of close cooperation with the EU was not substantially changed despite the shift
towards non-alignment and Third-World socialism under DomMintoff ’s charismatic
leadership.
The EU really became a hot issue after the return to government of the Nationalists
in 1987 and the 1990 membership application. So much so that for some years this
acute bipolarisation on EU membership even defined the main cleavage in Maltese
politics (Cini 2000; Pace 2002, p. 32). Initially, Labour oscillated between an unclear
pragmatism and a clear opposition to membership. Eventually, the latter became the
official position, and when Labour won the 1996 election the application was
suspended.
The 1996 Labour government was short-lived, and when the Nationalists returned
to government in 1998 they revived the application and obtained membership (Pace
2004). EU accession was put to a popular referendum, following which a national
election was also called. Thus, in 2003 Malta voted twice for Europe (Cini 2003). The
‘yes’ front won the referendum by a margin of 52.9 to 42.7 per cent, and the
Nationalists won the national elections.
The political confrontation surrounding membership left a deep mark on Malta’s
politics. The Nationalists received a boost, which retrospectively makes the 1996–98
Labour government a short parenthesis within a long Nationalist cycle lasting about
25 years. Labour won the 2004 European election, but narrowly lost the 2008 national
elections and was compelled to elect a new leader. With its new leader and party
structure, Labour increased its margin over the Nationalists in the 2009 European
election and, most importantly, won the 2013 national elections by a landslide.
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Malta’s European and Mediterranean identities (Cini 2000) could finally coexist
peacefully (Cini 2004; Pace 2005). The obvious political consequence of the path to
membership was that incentives for any of the main parties to campaign against the
EU were, at least for some time, removed from the system. Moreover, in just a few
years, EU membership managed to acquire a positive image among a large section of
the population. This and other shorter-term contextual factors are discussed below in
the analysis of the election campaign.
Ten Years of Membership and the Context of the Elections
The first decade of membership resulted in the transformation of Malta’s society.
The economy adapted relatively quickly, while sustained economic growth eclipsed the
austerity policies pursued during the negotiations and the first years of membership to
put the country’s economy and finances on a sustainable path. The whole decade
passed under Nationalist governments. Labour came close to victory in the 2008
national elections, but the Nationalists were eventually confirmed winners (Fenech
2008). The Nationalists successfully pursued liberal economic policies. Their work was
facilitated by the emergence of a substantial economic consensus between the main
parties: electoral competition shifted away from policy agendas towards issues of
competence and approach to problems (Fenech 2013).
In the last term (2008–13) of almost a quarter of a century of Nationalist
government, the public mood began to lean towards change. The Nationalists had
clearly run the economy well, but were facing discontent and criticism of nepotism
and corruption. The first two European elections, held in 2004 and 2009, were won by
Labour, which was effectively renewing its policy and leadership (Pace 2005, 2009,
2011). The policies and strategies of the two main parties diverged most in the sphere
of values. The debate heated up and became very contentious during the 2011
referendum on divorce. A revival of conservative religious influence within the
Nationalist Party had become increasingly evident in the last six years, and the party
took a strong position against divorce. Conversely, Labour, which had a long history of
laity and even overt confrontation with the Catholic Church, took a clear position in
favour of divorce (Pace 2012). The ‘yes’ front eventually won by an unexpectedly
comfortable margin, which left the Nationalists as a party ‘divorced from reality’
(Fenech 2012). Laity became a hallmark of the renewed Labour Party, which once back
in government immediately passed a law on same-sex marriage.
A core element of the change in the public mood of the post-membership decade
was the attitude towards the EU. This is shown in Figure 1, which presents
Eurobarometer data on the image of Europe among the Maltese public in the period
2003–13. The figure shows data about Malta, as well as the EU average, other southern
member state averages (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus) and the average of
2004–07 accession states (excluding Malta). The trend line indicates the net image of
Europe, which we created by subtracting negative from positive “images of Europe”.
In 2004, this indicator was relatively low for Malta (27 per cent) in comparison with
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the EU average (38 per cent), the average for new member states (40 per cent) and
especially the significantly higher net positive image the EU enjoyed in Southern
European member states (48 per cent). This is scarcely surprising, as the data were
collected only a year after the divisive EU referendum. Things could not have been
more different in 2013, at the end of the series. In the rest of Southern Europe, negative
images surpassed positive ones by 21 points. In the EU as a whole, there was basically
no gap, with positive and negative views balancing out each other. The EU enjoyed a
better image among citizens of new member states, with a positive gap of 13 points.
In comparison with all other areas, the 27 per cent positive gap observed in 2013 in
Malta was impressive.
The disaggregated data show that over time the share of Maltese public opinion
with a positive image of Europe averaged around 45 per cent, with a slightly upward
trend after accession and a slightly downward trend from 2009 to 2011, during the
first part of the international financial crisis. Similarly, the share of the population
with a negative image of Europe has been relatively low and overall constant, except
for a moderate increase in 2009–11. The group that is perhaps most similar to Malta
is that of the new member states, the citizens of which still have relatively pro-EU
views. Most importantly, the share of Malta’s population with a positive image of the
EU is far higher than the average in other Southern European countries. Even more
marked is the gap between positive and negative perceptions, strikingly lower in
Malta than in the other southern EU countries. While at the beginning of the series,
in 2004, positive attitudes towards the EU were lower in Malta than in any other
group, by 2013 they were consistently higher than in all of them. Meanwhile, the
share of Malta’s population with a neutral image of Europe has been on the increase,
which indicates Malta still has a permissive consensus towards the EU (Lindberg &
Scheingold 1970).
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Figure 1 Public Opinion of Europe – Malta, EU, Southern Member States and New
Member States Compared (2004–13)
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurobarometer data, available online at: http://ec.europa.
eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm. Answers to the question: ‘In general, does the European
Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very
negative image?’
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Figure 1 shows that the difference between Malta and other southern member states
(but also, though to a lesser extent, between the new member states and the EU
average) became noticeable around 2010–11, and then widened greatly. The negative
turn within southern public opinion coincided with the economic crisis, financial
turmoil, austerity policies and the generalised shift of blame towards the EU. In this
respect, Malta looks like an entirely different case. One reason behind the peculiar
nature of the Maltese 2014 European election when compared with most of the other
Southern European countries is that the Maltese economy has been left largely
unscathed by the financial crisis and the economic downturn. The crisis did slow down
the Maltese economy, yet economic growth turned negative only for a few months in
2009 and regained a sustained pace in 2012 and 2013. Unemployment remained
relatively low – strikingly so in comparison with other southern member states – at
around 6.5 per cent, and the expectations were of strong economic growth in the next
few years.
Against this changing context of Maltese society, the 2013 national elections
eventually brought the long-awaited shift in the electorate (Fenech 2008, 2013). After
having failed by a small margin in 2008, the renewed Labour Party won by a landslide,
with an impressive margin of 11.5 points over the Nationalists. The government was
still in its honeymoon period when the campaign for the European election began.
The Election Campaign
Preparations for the European election started soon after the March 2013 national
elections. In July, the Labour Party opened nominations for potential candidates while
the Nationalist Party’s executive council approved eight candidates. Labour approved
its first batch of candidates in August, then AD announced its two candidates in
December. The campaign slowed down over Christmas and New Year, but picked up
again soon after the festivities, the Nationalists announcing their second batch of
candidates in January 2014.
Probably the most controversial – and, with the benefit of hindsight, significant –
choice by the Labour Party was to nominate former party leader Alfred Sant as a
candidate. Dr Sant was the leader of the party when it won the 1996 national election,
but also when it lost those of 1998, 2003 and 2008. He had actively campaigned against
Malta’s EU membership, and doggedly refused to recognise the result of the 2003
membership referendum. Notwithstanding the fact that some Labour supporters were
critical of his stance on Europe, he still enjoyed overwhelming popularity among them.
Pre-election opinion polls constantly showed he was likely to be elected first from
among his fellow party candidates, if not from among all candidates. The election
confirmed this prediction, for he polled enough votes to be the only candidate to be
elected on the first count, with a few thousand votes to spare. This certainly influenced
Labour’s post-election decision to ask him to lead its European delegation.
In November 2013, the Nationalist Party mounted a concerted campaign, both in
Malta and in the European Parliament, against an investment scheme launched by the
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government consisting of the issuing of Maltese citizenship to foreigners investing
in Malta. The debate peaked on 16 January 2014 when the European Parliament
approved a resolution on the sale of EU citizenship. The scheme had to be amended
several times to make it conform to EU requirements, and the controversy raged right
up to the European election. The beginning of this issue served as an avant-propos of
the main European campaign – the pace of which really started picking up in April
2014.
On 21 April, the two main political parties held rallies to mark the start of their
campaigns. Labour’s slogan was ‘Positive Energy’, while the Nationalists chose ‘A Better
Malta’. The Nationalists appealed to voters to use their votes to show their
disappointment with the way the Prime Minister was running the country, claiming
that pre-election Labour promises of meritocracy, transparency and ‘a government
that listens’ had all been set aside by the new government. Labour responded with
claims it was keeping its election promises. The centrepiece of its campaign was the
reduction of energy prices for households, announced in the 2014 budget that had
been approved on 21 November 2013. These reductions were timed to take effect in
March 2014, just before the start of the last phase of the European election campaign.
Energy prices for households were one of the main issues on which Labour had won
the 2013 national election.
Absence of Europe
The main political parties issued electoral manifestos based on their respective
political groups’ programmes. Concurrently, individual candidates organised their
own personal campaigns. In May the broadcasting authority started a series of debates,
while the main parties put up billboards around the islands and employed their media
(newspapers, television and radio channels, social media, etc.) to the full. The
campaign had a strong second-order imprint from the very beginning. It was soon
dominated by domestic political issues largely mirroring the main concerns of public
opinion, European ones being sidelined. Prominent issues included a planned new
electricity-generating plant in the south of the island, the resignation of a minister and
a junior minister which precipitated a cabinet reshuffle, the election of a new president
of the Republic and the Civil Union Act (Harwood 2015). Approved on 14 April 2014,
the Act once again split the Nationalist Party to the point that it had to abstain in the
parliamentary vote – a not very auspicious start to its European campaign.
Limited space was given to the discussion of deeper EU issues. The only moments
when more space was afforded to them was when Martin Schultz and Jean Claude
Junker addressed meetings during their visits to Malta to campaign as the presidential
candidates of their respective political groups. From this angle, the idea to tie the
appointment of the president of the Commission to the outcome of the European
elections benefited the mobilisation of Maltese public opinion on EU issues, although
the significance of this in comparison with the rest of the campaign was rather
circumscribed. Even when the media presented the political messages of Schultz and
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Junker, they tended to give them a local bias to make them appeal more to their
respective local followers.
The leaders of both Labour and the Nationalists emphasised their personal
acquaintance with the respective political group’s presidential candidate, to signal to
voters that a vote for them was a vote for a party that would have influence in a future
Commission. Both Schulz and Juncker emphasised the need for an EU approach
on immigration; not coincidentally, as this is an issue of recurrent concern for the
Maltese. Juncker pledged that should he became Commission president he would
ensure that EU solidarity on migration would not remain an empty promise.
For its part, AD adopted positions on the main issues discussed by the two main
parties, among which immigration featured prominently. AD stressed the need for
responsibility sharing and a European policy on legal migration. It also emphasised its
European credentials, stressing that together with the European Greens, of which it is
a member, it could contribute to improving the quality of life of the Maltese,
particularly in terms of social and environmental standards. AD has been a vociferous
opponent of spring hunting, supported in turn by a strong lobby. AD’s campaign led
to the establishment of a coalition of non-governmental organisations that collected
more than 43,376 signatures to force an abrogative referendum to ban the practice.
Other issues championed by AD included food safety, clean air and renewable energy;
an EU that works for peace, human rights and international cooperation; and the
protection of citizens’ digital rights and personal data.
The voice of the far right, IE, like that of all the other small parties, was less audible.
Its campaign was largely confined to social media; it obtained limited access to
the state media when it participated in debating programmes organised by the
broadcasting authority. In its manifesto, IE expressed itself as against a mercantile
Europe and in favour of a new Europe of regions and peoples. It emphasised its belief
in high culture and the separation of Church and state. It claimed Europe is capable of
feeding itself and of sustaining its ageing population without the need for immigrants.
The party called for tax incentives to encourage young couples to have more children,
the protection of the environment, an end to immigration and the preservation of
Europe’s racial and cultural identity.
The election campaign was largely inward-looking. The campaigns of the main
parties were much scaled down in comparison with national election campaigns.
Notwithstanding the growing significance of the EU, the increasing power of the
European Parliament and even the relevance of the 2014 election to the appointment
of the Commission president, the focus on national issues ensured voters did not
debate the importance of the European Parliament. Domestic issues, such as the
construction of a new power plant, were far more central than such broader EU
issues as the austerity–growth debate or the fate of the European currency.
Occasionally, the EU did enter the discussion, but there was no grand debate on big
EU choices: Europe featured only when connected to domestic issues. This was also
true of the visit by the candidates for the presidency of the Commission: in their
public appearance, they discussed those issues of concern to the domestic population
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where the EU could have a role, such as migration and energy. Overall, the short-
term context of the election and the election campaign was largely in line with SOEs
where little is at stake (Reif & Schmitt 1980) and the EU does not matter (Hix &
Marsh 2007). The extent to which election results also conformed to the SOE model
is discussed below.
The Vote and the Election Results
We have so far shown how political institutions reinforce Malta’s political stability, and
how historical factors and the context of the election contributed to depoliticising EU
issues. Such a depoliticised context is a key prerequisite of the SOE model, which, we
argue, explains much of the election results. We now move on to illustrate the results
of the election, and its consistency with the SOE model. The lack of individual-level
data prevents us from conducting a systematic test of the hypotheses; however, we seek
to make the most of the available aggregate data by providing a number of indicators
and discussing the extent to which they conform to, or depart from, the expectations
of the SOE model.
Newspapers covered the election campaign with a number of pre-election surveys
of the party strengths. The newspaper that surveyed voters most consistently was
MaltaToday (Debono 2014). Table 1 shows the results of monthly averages in March
and April, and of the last survey carried out on 22 May, just two days before the
election. These polls showed the Nationalists continuously trailing Labour by a
substantial margin. The polls predicted the result fairly accurately, although they
underestimated the scale of Labour’s victory.6 The results of the 22 May survey are
particularly interesting because, absent official individual-level data on the election at
the time of writing, this was the only evidence available of where voters came from in
terms of voting in the previous FOE.
Table 1 Voting Intentions in Maltese Pre-election Polls 2014 (%)
Party that
respondents are
intending to
vote for
All respondents
Party that respondents in the 2013 national
election voted for
March April 22 May Nationalist Labour
Vote switchers:
Nationalist in 2008
to Labour in 2013
Nationalist 25.5 31.7 31.5 86.1 1.2 10
Labour 32.7 35.3 37.2 1.4 80.8 30
AD 1.3 1.8 2.9 1.4 0.8 10
Others 0.5 0 1.2 0.5 0.8 0
Don’t know 25.5 17.0 11.5 6.2 7.7 40
Not voting 5.3 5.2 5.4 0.9 5.7 10
No reply 9.2 9.0 10.3 3.5 3.0 0
Source: Own elaboration from data published by MaltaToday, available online at: http://www.
maltatoday.com.mt/news/europe_2014/39279/maltatoday_survey_labour_in_sixpoint_lead#,
VHCMk_l5OVV
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The large majority of those who voted for the main parties in the 2013 national
election were willing to confirm their preference. More than ten per cent were
undecided, and only about four per cent declared they would vote for smaller parties –
a small fraction, though not so small according to Maltese standards.MaltaToday also
asked respondents to indicate whether they had switched their vote between the 2008
and 2013 national elections. In this way, the voting intentions of the very important
swing voters could be measured. Two days before the election, 40 per cent of vote
switchers remained undecided and ten per cent were unwilling to go to the polls.
About one-third declared they were inclined to confirm their preference for the
governing Labour Party, while 20 per cent were equally divided between the main
opposition party, the Nationalists and the AD. Eventually, however, most voters voted
for the two main parties. This is consistent with the argument made above about the
psychological effect of the electoral system, which discourages sincere voting – even in
European elections.
Table 2 includes data on the three rounds of European elections held in Malta, the
preceding national (first-order) elections and the difference between them. About
258,000 voters – 74.8 per cent of those entitled to vote – went to the polls. This would
be a very high participation rate elsewhere in Europe, but was less so in Malta. Turnout
was four points lower than in the previous European election, while in comparison
with the 2013 national elections it was about 18 points lower. The percentage of invalid
votes cast was 2.2 per cent, slightly higher than the 1.4 per cent registered in the 2013
national election.
While Malta’s electoral system may not be one of the most complex in the world
(Hirczy 1995), it is certainly a complicated one: in fact, counting was not completed
until the evening of 28 May – a whole four days after the polls closed. Once again, in
the European election voters rewarded Labour – at least in terms of votes. However,
whereas in the 2004 and 2009 elections it was in opposition to the Nationalist
government, in 2014 Labour was running as the incumbent. The 54.3 per cent of first
preferences received, largely similar to the result of the 2013 national elections,
confirmed the government was still in its honeymoon period with the electorate.
The Nationalists, in turn, replicated their 2009 performance – when they were in
government. The party received 40 per cent of first preferences, winning three instead
of two seats. In comparison with the 2013 national elections, the gap between the two
main parties widened by two per cent points in favour of the governing party.
Taken together, the two main parties received a respectable 93.4 per cent of votes –
and all of the seats. The most distinctive feature of Malta’s party system – its two-party
character – was not affected by the winds of European contestation. However, while in
the 2013 national elections the two main parties left only 1.8 per cent of the vote to the
other parties (almost all of which went to AD), the 6.5 per cent of the votes that went
to the other parties at this European election held some surprises. AD continued their
slow – and to many hopeless – march towards parliamentary representation, gaining
almost one point over their result at the 2013 national elections, but only a half-point
on their 2009 European election result.
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One surprise came from the number of women elected. Although the STV is
generally considered to penalise them (Lane 1995; Ortega Villodres 2008), this time
the Maltese elected more women (four) than they did men (two). Malta had not
elected women to the European Parliament until a year before, when three women
replaced the MEPs who resigned after being elected to the national parliament. The
prevalence of women MEPs could be one more sign of the broader societal change of
recent years, culminating in the 2011 divorce referendum and the 2013 Civil Unions
bill. The most surprising – though admittedly largely unnoticed – result, however,
was the growth of the neo-fascist IE, which jumped to 2.7 per cent. Not only did it
almost double the number of votes it had won at the 2009 European elections, it also
came close to threatening AD’s position as Malta’s third party.
Overall, the vote consolidated the shift of the Maltese electorate towards Labour,
which tightened its hold on the country. The defeat of the Nationalists was obscured
by the intricacies of the STV system, which turned a defeat in terms of votes into a 3–3
draw in terms of seats. Ironically, having managed to win three seats for the first time,
the Nationalists could even claim their own victory: this time the losers benefited from
the disproportional effects of the system and its occasionally perverse consequences
(Doron & Kronick 1977). These can be more marked in European elections because
the number of parliamentary seats is fixed at six and cannot be increased to ensure
proportionality between seats and votes as happens in national elections.
A Second-Order Election?
Table 2 includes further indicators relevant to the SOE model for all European
elections and the domestic elections held before them. All the indicators support the
SOE model: turnout and valid votes are systematically lower than in previous FOEs;
parties in government lose and parties in opposition gain votes; smaller parties do
better; larger parties do worse. That was also true of the 2014 election, which, however,
when compared with previous European elections, appeared a somewhat less marked
case of SOE.
Turnout declined by 13 points in 2004 compared with the 2003 national elections,
and kept falling in the 2009 and 2014 European Parliament elections. In the 2004
election, large parties lost about 11 points to small parties relative to the national
elections held in 2003. Almost all those votes were lost by the Nationalists in
government and gained by small parties, particularly AD, which never managed to
come close to that result in subsequent elections. This result may have left an
important mark on the electorate, as its memory may still discourage voters from
supporting small parties for fear of wasting their votes. In 2009, large parties only lost
three points to small parties. The Nationalists, then still in government, lost nine
points to opposition parties, but the votes shifted to Labour rather than to the smaller
parties.
In the 2014 election, the party in government – this time Labour – did only slightly
worse than in the 2013 national election. It lost 3.3 per cent points, but it still obtained
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more than 50 per cent of valid votes and emerged as the indisputably strongest
electoral force. The relative success of Labour in government differed from the pattern
of earlier European elections, and was also a partial deviation from the SOE model.
True, the SOEmodel expects government parties to perform better when they are close
to the beginning of the electoral cycle (that is, when an SOE is held not long after an
FOE). It still remains to be explained, however, why parties in government did much
worse in past European elections (212 and 28.8) even though SOEs were held
virtually at the same distance in time from the preceding FOE.
A possible explanation could be that the previous European elections fell within a
longer electoral cycle, one that had begun when the Nationalists first entered in
government in 1987 and lasted (with a short interruption in 1996–98) until Labour’s
victory in 2013. Therefore, when the 2004 and 2009 European elections were held the
Nationalists were not (only) at the beginning of ‘new’ electoral cycles that began with
the national elections of 2003 and 2008, respectively, but were also approaching the
end of the longer cycle that had begun in 1987. In contrast, the 2014 European election
fell close to the beginning of an entirely new Labour Party cycle, thus the party in
government could actually benefit from the proximity of the two elections: Labour had
just emerged from a large national election victory in March 2013, one with few
precedents in Malta’s electoral history, and the majority of voters still supported it.
Lacking individual-level data, we cannot offer systematic evidence for this
explanation. However, the aggregate data seem to support it. It is also confirmed by
pre-election surveys of swing voters (Table 1), which showed how a large share of those
who had voted for Labour in the 2013 national election after having voted Nationalist
in 2008 were still inclined to confirm their vote in the 2014 European election. Long
electoral cycles are also consistent with infrequent alternation in government, which is
a recurrent characteristic of small states (Taagepera 1999; Sikk & Taagepera 2014).
In addition, decreasing popularity through the cycle (rather than falls in the middle
and recovery at the end) seems to capture better the relationship between FOE and
SOE in such cases (Hix & Marsh 2011).
Conclusions
The 2014 European election in Malta largely conformed to the SOE model.
In comparison with the 2013 national election, turnout and valid votes fell; large and
government parties lost votes, while small and opposition parties gained. To the degree
to which it conformed to the SOE model, the election was different from that in many
other European countries – especially from other southern member states, which saw
their party systems shaken by the economic recession. It can safely be claimed that in
Malta the ‘giant is (still) sleeping’ (Van der Eijk & Franklin 2004) and that the country
still finds itself in a state of ‘permissive consensus’ towards the EU (Lindberg &
Scheingold 1970).
Maltese voters – or, perhaps more correctly, the STV – allocated the six available
seats equally between the two main Maltese parties, the Nationalists and Labour.
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Together, these parties attracted more than 90 per cent of the votes cast, with the rest
shared almost equally between the third party, AD – which yet again failed to obtain
parliamentary representation – and IE, a neo-fascist formation that delivered a
surprising performance and came close to winning three per cent of the votes. The
election was mostly fought on domestic issues, and was part of a longer electoral cycle
in which the Nationalists have progressively lost votes to Labour. This decline began
with the 2004 European elections, continued in the 2008 national elections and the
2009 European elections and culminated in the 2013 national elections that returned
Labour to government after almost 25 years in opposition.
On its own, the gentler impact of the economic crisis on Malta does not explain the
outcome of the election and its second-order character. On the one hand, the election
produced some signs – such as the vote for IE – that Malta was in some way attuned
to the broader Eurosceptic mood. On the other, we have shown that the somewhat
deviant result of the 2014 European election in Malta is more accurately explained by a
combination of factors. The stable political institutions of Malta’s majoritarian
democracy – and notably the strongly centralised government and almost perfect two-
party system – shield the system from the challenge of outsiders. The bipolarisation of
the political system has been reinforced by the achievement of independence, and by
the socio-cultural texture of the country as it developed in the second half of
the twentieth century. Against this background, Malta’s distinctive path to EU
membership also contributed to the marginalisation of anti-EU political actors,
removing the incentives for campaigning against Europe. Finally, the more immediate
context of the election indicates that, taken together, persistent economic growth, a
relatively large share of the public favouring the EU and a broad societal shift towards
post-materialist values provided an unattractive basis for EU contestation.
However, this article has also shown that, though remarkably stable, the political
system is not inert. Change manifested itself in less visible yet significant respects. One
of these was the election of women, part of a broader change in the social mood
culminating in the 2011 divorce referendum and the 2013 Civil Unions Act. The
success of the extreme-right IE also surprised observers. And yet Malta elected no
explicitly Eurosceptic party. This was probably the main aspect in which the Maltese
vote departed most visibly from the outcome of the elections in other southern EU
member countries. However, to conclude that Malta’s elected MEPs would not
represent Euroscepticism in the European Parliament would be misleading. Alfred
Sant, a prominent figure within the main governing party, concentrated his campaign
on a posture strongly critical of the EU and received by far the highest number of
preferences among all candidates. He surely garnered the EU-critical, if not the
Eurosceptic, vote, and the Labour Party eventually asked him to lead its delegation in
the European Parliament.
The 2014 election outcome is indicative of the capacity of the two main parties to
provide representation to a wide range of positions, thus neutralising the challenge of
smaller parties. However, it also indicates the persistence of a considerable share of
voters who are lukewarm towards the EU. The Eurobarometer time series shows that
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the EU has an overall solidly positive image among the Maltese, but it also notes a
rising share of public opinion that is neutral towards the EU. As long as membership
remains a positive-sum game for Malta, the main parties can manage to internalise
opposition to the European project; however, while the joint operation of political
institutions ad cultural-historical and contextual factors effectively shield Malta from
successful anti-EU political actors, some embers smouldering beneath the ashes could
be invigorated by a changing economic climate or some other unexpected event.
At that point, it remains to be seen whether Malta’s political institutions would be as
effective at preventing those tensions from awakening the sleeping giant.
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Notes
1. See article by Schmitt and Teperoglou (2015).
2. Ibid.
3. Q ¼ Valid Votes6 seatsþ1
 
þ 1
4. In 2003, 2008 and 2013 national elections the average Droop quota was 3,619, 3,729 and 3,918.
Thus for example in 2013 AD, which obtained 5,506 first-count votes, was nowhere close to
obtaining a full quota in at least one district to enable it to capture a seat. Theoretically, a party
could have obtained close to between 40,000 and 50,000 votes without electing one seat by falling
just short of the quota in all districts.
5. For example, the Nationalists won the 2008 national election with a margin of about 1,500 votes,
which gave them a one-seat majority in parliament.
6. Around one-fifth of respondents did not reply or claimed not to know which party they would be
voting for. This may have contributed to the mismatch between the percentages shown in the poll
on voters’ intentions and the actual election results.
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